Hon. James S. Cowan (Leader of the Opposition)

Honourable senators, the issue of democratic reform is one that this government has espoused for some time. Prime Minister Harper even created a special Minister of State for Democratic Reform and appointed the Honourable Steven Fletcher to that position. I take the government at its word that it is committed to real democratic reform in this country, and it is to that end that I have launched this inquiry.

I begin by stating the obvious — that real democratic reform cannot be imposed, not even by a prime minister. The result of a unilateral action can never be enhanced democracy. A healthy democracy requires a leader to listen to the views of others and, in some circumstances, to accept those views even if the leader disagrees with them. However, that is not what we have seen from the Harper government's so-called democratic reform agenda.

A constitution, by its nature, is the antithesis of unilateral action. Constitutions are the product of discussion and compromise. The Canadian Constitution contains a detailed amending formula meticulously negotiated over many years. At a minimum, for certain limited amendments, the Constitution requires that the three constituent parts of the Parliament of Canada agree to the amendment — that is, the House of Commons, the Senate and the Crown. However, the overwhelming weight of the evidence heard by our Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs a few years ago, to use the committee's words, suggests that the reforms proposed by Prime Minister Harper require more; they require the involvement and agreement of our constitutional partners, the provinces.

In 2006, this chamber was presented with a proposal for Senate reform. After listening carefully to the evidence, including persuasive evidence from a number of provincial governments, the Senate urged the Government of Canada to refer its proposal to the Supreme Court of Canada to determine whether it was constitutional. The government declined to accept our advice. Instead, on May 28, 2009, it chose simply to retable the same bill and then let it sit on the Order Paper.

The government refuses to discuss the proposals with the provinces. It insists, notwithstanding the views of numerous experts, that the Parliament of Canada possesses the authority to pass the proposed constitutional amendments on its own. When one of the chambers of that Parliament expressed the view that it did not believe that Parliament possessed that power, the government, instead of examining the merits of the objections, chose to appoint brand new senators on the express condition that they support the government's opinion; and this in the name of democracy.

What kind of democracy is this? What kind of reform to the chamber of sober second thought is effected when the only permitted sober second thought is to say, "Yes, Prime Minister, whatever you say"?

Honourable senators, I initiated this inquiry to begin the kind of real discussion on Senate reform that this government has refused to engage in. I hope that many honourable senators on both sides of the chamber will decide to participate, because this is our country and the Constitution is the bedrock of our country. I hope we can engage Canadians in that discussion.

At times, I feel that many of us simply take for granted the truly special nature of this country in which we live. In so many ways, we have been a beacon of light and hope to the rest of the world. Democratic reform is fine, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Canada is now a great democracy, indeed an extraordinary democracy, in a world filled with turmoil and failed states.

Our history is one of tolerance, of finding ways to work out our differences peaceably. We truly are a peaceable kingdom. It is not that we have somehow been an island untouched by difficulties. Of course we have had our problems, and we have always had challenges throughout our history; however, as a nation, we have always been able to meet and work together to address those problems.

The credit for this remarkable history and success belongs to all Canadians, but let us acknowledge the special debt we owe to the Fathers of Confederation. Their wisdom and foresight established institutions that have allowed us to address even terribly divisive issues, and we have done so with an enviable record of peace and mutual respect. So many countries around the world live with the threat of violence, terrible bombings, hostage-takings and other terrorist acts because groups of citizens disagree with their government and insist on having their own way, whatever the cost to their neighbours.

I know that Prime Minister Harper has spoken over the years with shock and disdain about the fact that one of the opposition parties in the other place openly espouses a sovereignist or, as he says, albeit outside Quebec, separatist agenda. However, the suggestion that we are somehow less a nation because of this is wrong. I believe just the opposite. I am proud that as a nation, instead of facing years of bloody violence, we have a system that allows people, even those with such profoundly different views, to take their place in our Parliament.

For those who object to having such fundamental differences dealt with in Parliament through vigorous debate, I ask: How else should we broker and manage our serious differences? If Parliament is not the proper place to deal with differing aspirations of Canada's diverse peoples and regions, what venue do they suggest?

My real point is that what we are blessed with is no accident. Our system — and the Parliament of Canada, in particular — was designed specifically for a nation founded in diversity. It has not been without its problems, but it has worked well and Canada has flourished as a peaceful and prosperous nation.

Obviously, anything we build in this world can be improved. Any structure can be improved, but, just as the Fathers of Confederation were clear about the unusual diverse nature of the nation they were building, so must we be clear about the context and purpose of our proposals for change.

What is the Harper government's vision for Canadian democratic reform? In the last parliamentary session, Minister Fletcher's office put forward four bills. There were two bills in the other place: one to add two advance polling days to federal elections, and the other to eliminate the Senate Ethics Officer. His government also introduced two bills here in the Senate: one limiting political loans — a matter I would have thought primarily of interest to our colleagues in the other place unless, perhaps, this relates to our new colleagues who have, apparently, eight-year terms — and the other to limit the tenure of senators appointed to this place to a single eight-year term.

When the Senate tenure bill is reintroduced, it will be in its fourth reincarnation. It was introduced first in this chamber, then tried in the other place, and then basically the same bill was reintroduced here once again. In previous parliaments, the Harper government also tried on two occasions to pass a Senate appointment consultations act. That, too, never proceeded very far. The government has indicated that it plans to reintroduce this legislation for a third attempt, but to date has not done so.

It seems strange to me that this is the nature and extent of the democratic reform proposed by this government. I wonder how many Canadians, if asked about their priorities for an agenda of democratic renewal, would mention issues like term limits, advance polling days and the elimination of the Senate Ethics Officer. This is pretty thin gruel for those Canadians who are looking for real change so that their hopes and aspirations can be better reflected in our political structure.

Some Hon. Senators: Hear, hear.

Senator Cowan: Honourable senators, much has changed since 1867. Canada and the world are very different from the way they were 150 years ago. Canada stretches from sea to sea to sea. We are now ten provinces and three territories, with a population that has grown from less than 3.5 million in 1867 to more than 33.5 million today. The world itself is a vastly different place from the time of Confederation.

Is it time for Canadians to take a fresh look at our system of governance? Perhaps it is. However, the questions I have heard raised by Canadians are very different from the ones being considered by Prime Minister Harper and his Minister of Democratic Reform. Canadians I have spoken to are focused on the fact that education is the key to economic prosperity in the 21st century. They have asked if we can be a truly internationally competitive economy without a national education strategy. Canadians have talked to me about health care. Among other things, they have asked if the current allocation of shared responsibility for health inhibits the effective management of a pandemic like SARS or H1N1 in a world where viruses can be carried across the globe in a few hours. They ask if Aboriginal Canadians are well served by the present constitutional arrangements.

I appreciate that these would be difficult constitutional matters to resolve, but let us at least acknowledge, if we are discussing democratic renewal, that these would be issues of far greater concern to many Canadians, and probably most Canadians, than the question of two additional advance polling days.

This government has chosen to pursue a narrow vision of democratic renewal. Truth in advertising suggests it would be better referred to as parliamentary reform rather than democratic reform. Even so, this government refuses to ask the real questions. Their agenda seems to be much more about politics and being able to say that they did something rather than actually effecting real parliamentary renewal.

Indeed, if Prime Minister Harper were serious about his proposals for Senate reform, surely he would not have made the recent appointments to this place. If he were all that serious about wanting a chamber of senators who reflect the wishes of the electorate, then why did he appoint only Conservative senators?

In a recent article, Chantal Hébert considered what would have happened to recent Senate vacancies had there been an election for those seats. She wrote:

Over the past year, it is hard, for instance, to think of a scenario that would have seen the Conservatives win 32 senatorial seats spread out across Canada.

The pair of vacancies in Newfoundland and Labrador would more likely have gone to the Liberals or the NDP.

Among the eight new senators from Quebec, there might well have been four or five sovereignist members.

Surely if Mr. Harper were honest with Canadians in telling them that he wished to appoint only senators who had somehow been elected in their province, then he would have made appointments that reflected the political wishes as demonstrated by the people of those provinces.

Other prime ministers have appointed people affiliated with other parties. Senator Segal, Senator Nancy Ruth and Senator McCoy can attest to that, all having been appointed by Prime Minister Martin.

Prime Minister Harper appointed 33 Conservative Party loyalists as senators — 32 in just over one year — the most of any Prime Minister since Confederation. It is difficult not to question Mr. Harper's true commitment to a representative Senate.

However, recognizing that all of our new colleagues are reportedly fully in support of Prime Minister Harper's Senate reform goals, I fully expect that each of them will take pains to ensure that their positions on other bills reflect those of their regions over and above the views of the Conservative Party.

Some Hon. Senators: Hear, hear.

Senator Cowan: This should be interesting for our new colleagues from provinces that have openly opposed the Harper government's Senate reform bills.

Honourable senators, I know that all of us want the Parliament of Canada to be the very best that it can be, but we must be serious about this. Constitutional reform is not something to be taken lightly and it must be effected in accordance with the amending formula of the Constitution. If there is any doubt about the constitutionality of a particular approach, our system enables the Supreme Court of Canada to pronounce on that issue.

Prime Minister Harper has chosen to pursue a piecemeal approach — incremental parliamentary reform — because he argues we cannot succeed with a full constitutional amending process. Too many other issues get raised by too many other parties and this has made progress on Senate reform difficult.

Honourable senators, constitutions are designed to be difficult to change. It is intentional, and for good reason. If other issues get raised, it is because Canadians want them to be addressed, perhaps even more urgently than those the government may be focused on.

If there are problems reaching an agreement on a proposal for Senate reform, then those problems must be dealt with and not simply brushed aside. There is an established and recognized process for constitutional reform. That process calls for a consensus amongst the constitutional partners, the provinces, rather than the imposition of one person's chosen solution on the country, even if that person is the Prime Minister of the day.

I do not propose today to get into the concerns as to the constitutionality of the government's Senate reform bill. I will simply refer colleagues to my remarks on June 17, 2009, and especially to the report of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs on June 12, 2007, which was thoughtfully appended to the Senate Debates of that day at the request of the committee's then chair, my friend Senator Oliver.

Colleagues will see that the overwhelming weight of testimony heard by our Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs supported the conclusion that there were significant constitutional concerns if Parliament proceeded as proposed by the government. Witnesses told the committee that, as a minimum, the bill should be referred to the Supreme Court of Canada on a constitutional reference to determine whether or not it was constitutional. The committee agreed and then this chamber agreed. Unfortunately, Prime Minister Harper refused to accept this advice. Two years and nine months later, we are no further ahead.

In contrast, Mr. Harper has decided to ask the Supreme Court whether the Constitution would permit the creation of a national securities regulator. One would have thought that a call for a reference to the court should be even stronger when the issue relates to a constitutional amendment itself. However, the question whether constitutionally the government can proceed as it proposes is not my focus today. Instead, I wish to examine a little more carefully the implications of the government's narrow approach to democratic and parliamentary reform.

The highly respected Professor David E. Smith of the University of Saskatchewan recently devoted an entire book to the study of the Senate. It is called The Canadian Senate in Bicameral Perspective. He argues that part of the weakness of Senate reform in Canada is that it proceeds as if the Senate is a hermetically sealed, self-contained entity. He says the following, "There is no acknowledgement of the profound implications for the political system that would flow from such changes." In his words: "Bicameralism matters."

Professor Smith argues that Senate reform is not a question of elections to the second chamber and, presumably, even more so, not of Senate tenure, but rather of determining how that body should complement the work of the elected House of Commons. As he writes, "Absent this linkage, reform is impossible."

He also writes the following:

It is fundamentally important that Canadians agree on the second chamber's purpose. Without such agreement, there can be no consensus on the design of the chamber.

One of the strongest proponents of incremental Senate change and of the proposals presented by the Harper government is Roger Gibbins of the Canada West Foundation. However, the comments he made about the Harper government's Senate reform bills are hardly reassuring. In the first case I will quote here, he was speaking of the government's proposed Senate appointments consultations act, and he was appearing before a committee in the other place. Mr. Gibbins said this:

I do admit, and I think this is a critical point, that the changes proposed by Bill C-20 would leave us with a bit of a dog's breakfast in terms of the Senate. But I see this as a virtue of the bill rather than a fatal flaw. The bill would destabilize the status quo and therefore force Canadians to come to grips with the design of a modernized and democratic upper house.

A year later, Mr. Gibbins was appearing before our Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs during its study of the Senate tenure bill, and he made the same argument:

. . . we need a trigger . . . That is why I have argued for this kind of creative destruction, or whatever it is, as a way of destabilizing the status quo to the point where we are prepared or forced to address more fundamental structural questions.

Honourable senators, needless to say, I am appalled by this creative destruction scenario. Our goal must be to strengthen our parliamentary system, not to destabilize it.

Some Hon. Senators: Hear, hear!

Senator Cowan: Honourable senators, this is not a game where the Constitution and Canadians are pawns on some sort of chessboard. I hope that the days when a prime minister would try to roll the dice with our Constitution are long gone. It would be terribly ironic if the Prime Minister were trying to pass so-called reforms in an attempt to enhance executive power through the destabilization of the Parliament of Canada, all the while attacking the sovereignist opposition party in the other place, which in all its years of Parliament has never stooped to such tactics.

It is with real regret that I acknowledge that there may be some truth in what Dr. Gibbins has said. The changes proposed by the government, which it describes as "modest" steps, have a number of unintended consequences for our bicameral system, which could indeed, as Dr. Gibbins predicted, destabilize our present system of governance.

To begin with, an eight-year term would allow a two-term Prime Minister to appoint the entire chamber. Remember, whatever this Prime Minister's hopes may be, even under his most ambitious proposal, we are still dealing with a Senate wholly appointed by the Prime Minister. Under his Senate appointments consultations act, any elections are advisory only. Short of a formal constitutional amendment, the Prime Minister remains absolutely free to disregard the results of any so-called Senate election and appoint whomever he chooses. We have seen a prime minister appoint senators when he promised Canadians he would not. We have seen a prime minister disregard his own fixed election law. In view of this past behaviour, there is absolutely no assurance that the results of a consultative election would be respected.

Dr. Gibbins has said that majority governments face no effective constraints within the House of Commons, and therefore Senate reform can be seen as a way to provide some check on the government of the day. I doubt very much that a so-called reform that allows the Prime Minister to appoint the entire chamber over an eight-year period would fill a need identified by Dr. Gibbins.

Dr. Janet Ajzenstat, a leading expert on Canadian political history, has written that Sir John A. Macdonald and the other Fathers of Confederation believed "the singular advantage of parliamentary democracies" is that they protect the political minority, that is, the political opposition. She writes that Canada's founders placed a high value on "security for political dissent and respect for minority political rights." She quotes Sir John A. Macdonald as saying the following:

We will enjoy here that which is the great test of constitutional freedom — we will have the rights of the minority respected.

As Dr. Ajzenstat explains:

By the "minority," Macdonald does not mean ethnic or religious minorities, as commentators have sometimes supposed. (He discusses the issues of ethnic minorities elsewhere in the Confederation debates.) "Minority" here refers to the political minority, that is, the political opposition, in the Senate and Commons and in the populace at large. Macdonald is saying that the supreme benefit of parliamentary government is that it protects political opposition, the right to dissent. In most political systems the rights of the majority take care of themselves; despots of all sorts, even monarchic despots, seek to appease the majority in one way or another. The singular advantage of parliamentary democracies is that they protect the minority. Only in a parliamentary system must the majority refrain from ignoring or suppressing the complaints and interests of the political opposition.

I spoke at the beginning of my remarks about the remarkable foresight and wisdom of the Fathers of Confederation in building institutions that could channel profound differences into peaceful resolution. It was not only manifest in the careful balancing of our regional representation, education and linguistic protections, but I believe it was also demonstrated by recognizing that the Parliament of Canada is a place for political dissent and opposition.

Needless to say, this special role of dissent and opposition for the Senate, which goes back to the first principles of the Fathers of Confederation, would be seriously diminished by an eight-year term. There would be no opposition to a majority-dominated House of Commons from a chamber completely appointed by that majority's elected Prime Minister.

Witnesses who testified on the Senate tenure bill pointed out that one of the basic differences between the Senate and the other place is that the Senate does not have a regular turnover of membership. In this chamber, we have continuity of institutional memory; a long-term perspective exemplified by the so-called deans of the Senate; and developed expertise in particular subject matter.

What would the impact of a single eight-year term be on that feature, and what implications would it have for our relationship with the executive and the other place? Would we ever see again the likes of the various in-depth Senate studies that have framed and galvanized public policy debate in this country on a wide range of public policy issues, studies like the one on the concentration of media in Canada, health care, mental health, poverty, drug policy, euthanasia, assisted suicide, and the studies on defence and security, to name just a few?

Professor Smith also suggested that a short, non-renewable term could change the nature of the Senate because it might result in Senate terms coming early in one's career rather than late. The Senate could become a stepping stone to the other place rather than the other way around. He has written:

In other words, the relationship between the two chambers would be reversed and the independence that now attaches to senators, whose political ambitions are at an end, would be compromised.

These are just a few consequences for our bicameral system that would flow from an eight-year term from an appointed Senate, a seemingly modest step, but one that would have potentially very far-reaching consequences.

Of course, a move to an elected Senate would have enormous consequences for the role of this chamber and raise many questions about its role and position in Canada's parliamentary democracy.

There is certain to be a deadlock between the two houses. How would that be resolved? Would the Senate, with members elected for longer terms than members of the other place, and with constituencies of entire provinces rather than small ridings, emerge as the more powerful chamber, as is the experience in the United States? Would the members of such a chamber be content to serve primarily in a reviewing role, that is, as a chamber of sober second thought, considering and revising initiatives from the other place? What would be the impact on provincial and territorial governments and, in particular, their relationships with the federal government?

I was interested to read in a recent report in the Saskatchewan press to the effect that Saskatchewan Premier Brad Wall, whose government last year passed legislation to hold elections for Senate candidates, is apparently rethinking the idea. According to the article, and I quote:

The premiers, Mr. Wall suggests, may be better able to look after their provinces' interests in Ottawa than an upper house established specifically for that purpose.

Colleagues, you can understand why a number of provinces have been adamant in demanding that Prime Minister Harper's proposed changes cannot be passed by parliamentary diktat without their involvement.

Another challenge is reconciling elected senators with the fact that the Senate is not a confidence chamber. What about cabinet ministers? Would they be selected equally from both chambers? What will be the impact on our concept of responsible government, holding government to account for its actions? Would this be scattered between chambers? How would campaigning for election to one chamber affect campaigning and party organization for the other? What about the cost of campaigning over an entire province or territory? Would there be public subsidies for candidates for Senate elections? How ironic it would be if the result of reforms intended to make the Senate more democratic is that we end up with a Senate more attuned to the wealthy than is presently the case.

Prime Minister Chrétien appointed Sister Peggy Butts to this chamber, a nun from my province of Nova Scotia, who was a tireless advocate for the poor and underprivileged. She had taken a vow of poverty. Would a future Sister Peggy be able to sit in this chamber?

If we are to avoid creating, in the words of Roger Gibbins, "a dog's breakfast," then we must look at the full implications of any proposed change. We must, as Professor Smith argues, consider the Senate in a bicameral perspective, taking a similarly thorough look at the House of Commons. Any changes to one body necessarily impact the other, and it is not simply a matter of looking at the other place because we want to make changes to the Senate. In fact, I believe that many Canadians are dissatisfied with the way the other place works. The Senate may be a source of irritation, but that is not why voter turnout in this country is at an all-time record low. True parliamentary renewal demands an examination of both Houses of Parliament.

As colleagues are aware, Liberals held a series of roundtable discussions during the months when Parliament was prorogued. One of these, which I helped to organize, was focused on the state of health of Canada's parliamentary democracy. There were a number of serious issues raised by the panellists and members of the audience, issues like limiting the power of the Prime Minister's discretion to prorogue Parliament, the power of the Prime Minister's Office, citizen engagement, the need to strengthen parliamentary committees and the role of the media. There was minimal discussion of Senate reform. Indeed, it was unclear that it would even have been raised by anyone at all had it not been for the Harper government's focus on this issue.

Many issues were raised by Canadians during the recent prorogation of Parliament, including whether limits should be placed on the Prime Minister's absolute discretion to ask for prorogation. Canadians have said that changes to Question Period are required, and recent events indicate that there may be a need to re-examine the enforcement of parliamentary demands for documents, at least when those demands are made of the government.

The first and fundamental question, of course is: Do the provinces and Canadians wish to retain a bicameral system? The frustrations that have been expressed from time to time by governments of the day — not just this government but previous governments — that the Senate is obstructing or delaying the passage of particular legislation are in fact part of the essential nature of a bicameral system.

Professor Smith wrote:

At its core, bicameralism everywhere rests on obstruction: rather than empower, it restrains government. . . . Bicameralism is based on the premise that "two decisions are better than one." Since two decisions take more time, bicameralism means delay.

In other words, honourable senators, it is the nature of the beast. A second chamber will not be universally loved or admired, yet the vast majority of federations around the world have adopted bicameral federal legislatures.

Professor Ronald Watts has written:

The principle of bicameralism has been incorporated into the federal legislatures of most federations. Most federations have found a bicameral federal legislature to be an important institutional feature for ensuring the entrenched representation of the regional components in policy-making within institutions of "shared rule" that are an important element for the effective operation of a federation.

I believe that as a federation the conclusion today would be the same as it was in 1867, namely, that a bicameral system remains the best choice. Otherwise, certain provinces would find themselves unable to make their voices heard as they should.

George Brown expressed it well in 1865 when he said:

Our Lower Canada —

— and by that he meant Quebec —

— friends have agreed to give us representation by population in the lower house, on the express condition that they shall have equality in the upper house. On no other condition could we have advanced a step.

Many things have changed since 1865, but I suspect the need for some type of bicameral system for regional balance remains strong. However, Prime Minister Harper would like to jump immediately from the question of the bicameral nature of our part to the issues of tenure of senators and how they are appointed. Before these issues can be properly dealt with, we need to have a discussion and agreement on the relative functions, roles and powers of the two houses and consider how they will interact, and such a discussion must involve our constitutional partners, the provinces. They were present when the system was first designed and we already know that a number of provinces want to be involved in any proposed changes. The provinces must be there when those changes are made.

What is the purpose of the Senate? Prime Minister Harper and members of his government have defended appointments to this chamber on the grounds that they are necessary for the government's bill to pass through this chamber.

Some Hon. Senators: Hear, hear.

Senator Cowan: Senator Wallin was quoted recently in The Hill Times saying: "The primary job of the Senate constitutionally is to approve legislation, or to deal with legislation. . . ."

An Hon. Senator: Shame.

Senator Cowan: Honourable senators, it appears that the Harper Conservatives, including at least some of Prime Minister Harper's nominees to this chamber, believe the role of the Senate is to act as a rubber stamp of their government's agenda.

An Hon. Senator: It is embarrassing.

Some Hon. Senators: Shame, shame, shame.

Senator Cowan: That has never been our role. The Senate is a legislative chamber, and its constitutional job is not to approve legislation but rather to review and assess proposed legislation and, where appropriate, to make changes that then go back to the other place for consideration.

Some Hon. Senators: Hear, hear!

Senator Cowan: Accepting the designation of parliamentary rubber stamp for government legislation is not the path to enhancing our credibility and demonstrating our value to Canadians. I appreciate that this role may be the only way to which to win favour in the Prime Minister's Office but, under the current constitutional framework, the Senate is designed specifically and deliberately so as not to be concerned with currying favour with the executive.

Is that design something that Canadians believe should change? My impression is that Canadians emphatically do not want more power focused in the Prime Minister's Office. This impression was confirmed by the recent Nanos poll.

I believe our legitimacy derives first and foremost from doing a good job at the tasks given to us by Canadians under the Constitution.

Honourable senators, another fundamental question concerns the powers of the two legislative bodies in a bicameral system. Should both houses have essentially the same powers as the case is now, or should they be different? Is there a role for a house of Parliament representing the regions of our country? The role of the provinces and territories in the Canadian federation has changed substantially since 1867. What is the desired relationship between the provinces and the territories on the one hand, and the Senate on the other, and then vis-à-vis the federal government?

I spoke earlier of the original intent of the Fathers of Confederation in creating the Senate to represent political minorities; that is, the political opposition. The Senate was designed specifically so that it would be in a position to represent the views of the political opposition against the majority-elected government and majority-dominated House of Commons. Is that role still important?

The Senate also has a role representing other minorities: linguistic, cultural, religious, et cetera. People expect the Senate to stand up for these rights. Again, should that role continue? What should the functions of each house be?

Most observers, including many critics of the Senate, agree that the Senate performs particularly well in committee work, in studies of public policy issues, in legislative reviews and in scrutinizing government activities. Should the Senate do more studies of major public policy issues? Should the House of Commons undertake more studies? Should one or the other chamber emphasize this function, or retain the status quo?

Our role as a legislative chamber of sober second thought is acknowledged to be valuable, but it must be noted that it has never won us any friends or admirers among the government of the day of whatever political stripe. Nevertheless, most outside observers consider that work to be amongst our best.

Are there other things that the Senate should do? Should it have a role in ratifying treaties, as the Senate does in the United States? Senator McCoy spoke recently on a panel at a student-run conference at St. Paul's University. The interesting question for the panel was whether there is a way that the Senate can act as a catalyst for informed public engagement in ethical policy-making. I put the question to honourable senators: Is there a way, and should catalyst be part of the Senate's role?

In Australia, the Senate inquires into, and reports upon, estimates of expenditures referred to them. The Senate has the power to deny supply, and this power is real; it has been used. Should the Senate of Canada exercise greater power over estimates; perhaps review the estimates before they are presented to the House of Commons? The members of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance have developed long-standing expertise and perspective. Perhaps these strengths can be used to advantage here.

Once the powers, roles and functions of the Senate within our system are settled, then and only then should the issues of the distribution of seats, the election or selection of senators and the terms of senators be tackled.

If it is decided to retain the role of the Senate in representing political dissent, how will that role be reflected in the structure of a reformed Senate? If we are to continue to have a role representing linguistic, ethnic and other minorities, what impact, if any, does that choice then have on how senators are chosen?

I do not necessarily oppose elections for senators, but what about the parties who are impacted most significantly by this change: the provinces and territories, and the House of Commons?

As I mentioned earlier, arguably a senator elected with a mandate from an entire province for an eight-year term will have a strong claim to represent that province federally. What impact will this claim have on the role of provincial and territorial governments in our federation? In the United States, I think it is fair to say that federal senators wield a great deal of power in contrast to state governors. Honourable senators understand why the provinces and territories will have much cause to insist upon a role in deciding these issues.

A second chamber, to be of value, cannot be a mirror of the other house. If elected at the same time, possibly the composition of the two chambers will be similar, potentially undermining the likelihood that the Senate will be an effective check, either on the executive or on the other place.

Again, the role, powers and functions of each chamber inform how Senate elections are designed and timed. There are so many questions that need to be considered and addressed, some of which I touched on earlier.

Impasses or deadlocks will inevitably occur between the two houses. How will these be resolved if both claim electoral mandates and equal political legitimacy? Will the Senate be made into, or evolve into, a confidence chamber? What will happen to our cabinet system and the whole concept of responsible government, so fundamental to our system? How will that work in a system of two elected chambers?

Right now, the Senate's membership is more reflective of Canada than is the House of Commons. For instance, the Senate has the highest proportion of women members of any federal or provincial legislative assembly in Canada.

Some Hon. Senators: Hear, hear!

Senator Cowan: Aboriginal representation has always been stronger in this chamber than in the other place. Linguistic minorities are better represented. My friend, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition of the Senate, is a francophone woman from Alberta. Are there any francophone women from Alberta in the other place? I do not count any.

We have a depth and range of experience that is arguably unique and is a source of strength: former cabinet ministers; members of Parliament; provincial legislators; provincial and territorial premiers; mayors from large and small municipalities; public servants with experience at federal, provincial and municipal levels; professionals; leading politicians; leading physicians and lawyers; business persons; and academics. Is this depth and range desirable for the purposes agreed upon for the Senate? Can they be replicated in an elected chamber and, if not, is this a concern?

If senators are elected, what methodology will be used? Will it be on the same basis as that used in the House of Commons? Will it be some form of preferential ballot, proportional representation or some form of hybrid elections? If some form of proportional representation is adopted, how should this form be adapted for provinces or territories with few Senate seats, or only one seat?

How will this representation be rolled out on a transitional basis, given that there might be only one seat available at a particular time?

What system of election financing will be adopted? If there are to be province- or territory-wide campaigns, these will necessarily be much more expensive than MPs' campaigns. How can we best ensure the Senate does not — as I have alluded to before — become a place reserved for the wealthy?

What about the role of political parties? Increasingly, questions are being raised about our partisan political system. It seems likely that political parties would play a significant role if we move to an elected Senate. Is that a concern for Canadians?

Right now, we have a number of independent senators unaffiliated with any caucus. Is this, in fact, desirable? Is there a way — perhaps there is not — to design funding arrangements so that unaffiliated individuals can compete with affiliated ones in Senate elections?

These comments have related to issues that arise with respect to an elected Senate, but there have been numerous proposals over the years for various models — elected, appointed — but from a list of candidates prepared by a panel of respected Canadians, chosen somehow by provincial governments or legislatures, or mixed appointed and elected. The current government is clear as to its choice, but they are only one partner in this constitutional structure. These are not issues that can be decided unilaterally. The provinces must be afforded their rightful voice.

The issue of regional representation in the Senate is commonly viewed as one of the most pressing problems with the existing Senate, requiring redress as a first step in any Senate reform proposal. No proposal on this issue has been put forward by this government.

How should the seats in the Senate be allocated? In June of 2006, senators Austin and Murray proposed a motion to kick-start this constitutional change. Their motion proposed an amendment to the Constitution to increase the seats to 12 for British Columbia and 24 for the Prairie provinces — 10 to Alberta and 7 each for Manitoba and Saskatchewan — to reflect the significant growth of the western provinces since 1915 when seat allocation was last adjusted for those provinces. Alas, the government has not seen fit to pursue this initiative.

Senator Tkachuk had strong views on the proposal and proposed an amendment to the Austin-Murray motion on western province representation in the Senate. He would have made British Columbia a region with 24 senators rather than 12 as proposed by senators Austin and Murray. I hope he will join in the debate on this inquiry and present his current views to this chamber.

Other ideas have been put forward by interested Canadians. Thomas Hall, a retired House of Commons procedural clerk, and W.T. Stanbury, a professor at the University of British Columbia, recently wrote two long articles for The Hill Times in which they put forward some of their views on Senate reform. Their central goal, as they put it, was to build on the strengths of the Senate. In their view, quoting as they did from Andrew Potter, what the Senate does best is the old idea of serving as a chamber of sober second thought, effective scrutiny of legislation, and inquiry into the activities of the government and its various agencies.

Hall and Stanbury rejected an elected Senate, accepting that the Fathers of Confederation designed the Senate that way in order to ensure that the elected Commons would be the pre-eminent House of Parliament. They also set a goal that the reformed Senate not take power away from the democratically elected premiers.

Honourable senators, you can see how, in the words of Professor Smith, bicameralism and federalism matter. Agreement on this goal is critical for the choices in designing the Senate.

Hall and Stanbury had a number of interesting ideas, but I will confine myself to raising just two of them this afternoon.

They said that the best way to modernize the Senate and improve its effectiveness is to constrain the unfettered power of the Prime Minister to advise the Governor General to appoint people to the Senate. They said the manner in which the people are currently selected by the Prime Minister for appointment is the single-most important reason that the Senate has no legitimacy in the eyes of Canadians. Many of us would no doubt disagree that the Senate has no legitimacy in the eyes of Canadians, but few would disagree that there is a legitimacy issue faced by this chamber.

Hall and Stanbury proposed an independent Senate appointments commission to recommend candidates to the Prime Minister. The proposed Senate appointments commission would have 11 members, chaired by a retired judge and with 10 members, each representing a province, all of whom would be persons of high reputation who would have demonstrated a deep knowledge of public affairs.

The commission would then apply legislative criteria that reflect the tasks that senators are expected to perform: detailed review of bills originating in the other place; thoughtful discussion about the desirability and likely consequences of government bills; investigation of emerging and distant policy issues; and a forum for Canadians to make their voices heard on issues and initiatives.

Hall and Stanbury argued that the Senate would be better able to make a greater contribution if the role of political parties in this place was reduced both in how senators are elected — hence the Senate appointments commission — and also in how the Senate is organized. They suggested using the regional divisions established in the Constitution as an alternative to organizing the Senate by political party. The 105 senators would be grouped into four regional caucuses instead of political ones. They described how government bills could be handled under this new non-political approach. I will not go into details here other than to say that it is an original, thought-provoking idea and I recommend the articles to you.

Honourable senators, changing our parliamentary institutions is a serious endeavour. I believe it is legitimate to question whether the structure designed in the 19th century, which has served us so well for 140 years, is suited to the 21st century. However, it must be a serious discussion both in substance, addressing the real issues of concern, and also in how it proceeds, that is, engaging the provinces and territories and, I believe, Canadians themselves. It cannot be a rarefied discussion here on Parliament Hill, almost literally in a tower on the Hill. It cannot be a solution imposed on Canadians. We have seen that does not succeed.

Our Parliament was carefully designed by the Fathers of Confederation and the wisdom of many of their judgments has been proven over and over again throughout our history. We truly are a great country — the best country in the world, in my judgment — but that does not mean that we should be afraid to take a fresh look, with full knowledge of the history that has led us to where we are today and the reasons for the various choices made over the years.

Honourable senators, this afternoon I have tried to raise some questions. I invite each of you to engage in this important debate, to raise your own questions and perhaps propose answers. Then I challenge us to take the questions and answers to our provinces and to the citizens of our provinces. That is how we can begin a process of true parliamentary reform in the tradition of our great parliamentary democracy under the great Constitution of Canada.

Some Hon. Senators: Hear, hear!

Recent Statements from Liberal Senators